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PANEL TWO: THE PRESS, WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION LEAKS
Moderator:
David S. Ardia*
Panelists:
Heidi Kitrosser, David McCraw,
Mary-Rose Papandrea, David Schulz**
The following is a transcript of the second panel, discussing the
press, whistleblowers, and government information leaks, of First
Amendment Law Review’s 2021 Symposium on National Security,
Whistleblowers, and the First Amendment.1 The virtual event also
featured a keynote address by Mary-Rose Papandrea2 and a second panel
on Classification and Access to National Security Information.3
Ardia: I'm going to do very brief introductions of the
panelists. Honestly, I could go on for the entirety of the panel
just doing them justice with regard to their backgrounds on these
issues. All four of our panelists today are true experts on this
topic. So, we have with us Heidi Kitrosser. She’s the Robins
Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota and
currently a visiting professor of law at Northwestern Pritzker
School of Law. We also have David McCraw, who's Senior Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel at The New York Times
Company. We have Mary-Rose Papandrea, who probably
doesn't need any further introduction, but she is the Samuel Ashe
distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs at the University of North Carolina School of
* David S. Ardia is the Reef C. Ivey II Excellence Fund Term Professor of Law and
Co-Director of the Center for Media Law and Policy at the University of North
Carolina School of Law.
** Heidi Kitrosser is the Robins Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of
Minnesota Law School and the Newton N. Minow Visiting Professor of Law at the
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. David McCraw is the Senior Vice President
and Deputy General Counsel at The New York Times Company and a lecturer at
Harvard Law School. Mary-Rose Papandrea is the Samuel Ashe Distinguished
Professor of Constitutional Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the
University of North Carolina School of Law. David A. Schulz is a Floyd Abrams
Clinical Lecturer in Law and Senior Research Scholar at Yale Law School.
1
This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity. The editors have also inserted
footnotes throughout the transcript where there are references to specific cases,
statutes, works of scholarship, or other sources.
2
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Keynote Address: Examining the Assange Indictment, 19 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 213 (2021).
3
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Margaret Kwoka, David Pozen & Stephen I. Vladeck, Panel
One: Classification and Access to National Security Information, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
222 (2021).
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Law. And we have David Schulz, Floyd Abrams Clinical
Lecturer and Senior Research Fellow at Yale Law School.
My goal here is to really just get the conversation flowing
and then stay out of the way. Occasionally, I'll nudge the
conversation to keep things moving from topic to topic. We're
going to cover a number of different themes. I've given the
panelists some sense of what those areas are ahead of time. But,
I want to start by tying it together with the earlier panel and
placing it in the broader context of the issues that arise as we
think about national security, whistleblowers and the First
Amendment. I want to start really with an observation and a
question. And that is from Bush through Obama to Trump, the
government has launched a really unprecedented number of leak
investigations and Espionage Act4 prosecutions based on the
disclosure of classified information to the press. The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press reports that there were only
four leak prosecutions against media sources related to the leaks
in the entire period leading up to 2009.5 But in the decade that
followed, the number of prosecutions exploded, by their count,
to eighteen through 2019.6 And I want to ask Heidi to help us
understand what is driving this increase. Why has this issue
become so common compared to what it was historically?
Kitrosser: Well, there is a great deal of debate about that.
Dave Schulz and I talk about this in our paper that we wrote for
the symposium. My sense is that you could place the answer into
two buckets. One is about technology, and one is about
normalization. So, the technology part is quite simply that it is
so much easier now because of technology to find leakers, to
determine the source of stories for which the government wants
to find leaks using technological footprints than it ever used to
be. You know, every time somebody makes a call, it's quite easy
to trace it. Emails are very traceable. Even the classic meeting in
a dark alley, reporter-source interaction that we’re all so familiar
with going back to All the President's Men. Now you're
surrounded by surveillance cameras, every time you go in and
out of the government building you're swiping your digital pass.
So, part of it is technology. And, one anecdote that we put in the
4

The Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 22, 46
and 50 U.S.C.).
5
Katie Beth Nichols, Bringing the Reporters Committee’s List of Unauthorized Media
Disclosures to Life, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.rcfp.org/leak-investigations-chart-explainer/.
6
Id.
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paper that I think really speaks to this in kind of a chilling way is
that Lucy Dalglish, the former head of the Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, recounted a meeting that she had with
some Obama folks during the Obama administration where they
were talking about a reporters’ privilege federal statute.7 And she
recounts that one of the aides told her, you know what, you'll get
your statute, but we don't need it anymore.8 We don't need to go
to the journalist anymore in order to really get what we're
looking for.9
So, I think technology is part of the story. But I think
there's another part that's maybe more fundamental, and that’s
normalization. There is a way in which I think each prosecution
feeds the next, paves the way, and things get more normalized.
And this is the thing that Dave and I really trace in our paper.
We talk about how, first of all, when you look back at the
drafting and the passage of the Espionage Act, it seems by all
accounts that really nobody anticipated it or intended it to be the
quasi-official secrets act it's become.10 So, there just wasn't that
expectation. Plus, we didn't have a classification system outside
of the military until after World War II. There was no intention
or idea that it was going to be what it is. So, it's not surprising
when it was for the first time used to go after a reporters’ source
in the 1950s, there was a lot of consternation. There was a great
deal of publicity. There was an outcry. It wasn't used again until
the early 1970s with Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo. That
also was quite controversial. Plus, that prosecution ended in a lot
of embarrassment for the government. It wasn't used again until
Morison.11 Then, slowly, as you said, starting in the Bush
administration it has been increasingly used. So, I think it gets
normalized over time. Also, as we trace in our paper, and, of
course, we’ll talk more about later, the Morison case really paved
the way doctrinally for future prosecutions.12 So, I think that's
part of the story as well.
One last thing I’ll mention is I should give a nod to the
main additional argument that is sometimes made to explain
7

Heidi Kitrosser & David Schulz, A House Built on Sand: The Constitutional Infirmity of
Espionage Act Prosecutions for Leaking to the Press, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153, 182
(2021).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 166.
11
See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988).
12
Kitrosser & Schulz, supra note 7, at 185–203.
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this, which is that while technology is the reason, it’s not in the
way that I said. It's technology because the government has more
reason to be concerned now about leaks because of the ability to
create these massive leaks like we saw with Chelsea Manning,
for example. And certainly, as we've seen with WikiLeaks and
Julian Assange. I think that may be part of it. I think that by no
means fully explains it, though, in part because most of the
prosecutions aren't these massive leaks. I think it's much more
the other elements, and then that might provide some additional
justification.
Ardia: Everyone else on this panel probably has a view
on this question as well and a lot of experience with these issues.
Are you seeing the same things that are driving this? Actually, if
I can ask David McCraw this question, I was really shocked in
how candid Edward Snowden was after his leaking about his
feelings about the lack of OPSEC, the lack of security that the
reporters who were covering national security issues were using
in order to protect the identity of their sources. As I say to my
students, the Internet giveth and the Internet taketh away. It
gives us this perception of anonymity and ephemerality when, in
fact, it's just the opposite. These technological tools create a trail
that is almost impossible to erase. Is that something that you've
seen? You've been your position for a while and seen the
evolution of national security reporting. Is that something that
comes up in your conversations with reporters?
McCraw: I think it was much truer at the time of
Snowden. I think Snowden was a bit of a wakeup call. I think
Reality Winner was even more of a wakeup call. You'll recall
that after Reality Winner was arrested, there was much
discussion over whether the reporters had, in fact, caused her
detection and ultimate indictment and conviction. I thought
there was a lot of finger pointing in that debate, and I'm not sure
what the ultimate facts would have shown. But, I do think that
the outcome of that was that no reporter who's serious about
national security reporting wants to be that person who gets
blamed. I think there's much better work being done on that, at
least at the publications and outlets that I know of. We obviously
spent a lot of time talking about that. We bring in outside experts
to talk about how leak investigations are done. It's always a
difficult topic. I remember doing a seminar now more than
fifteen years ago at The Times and having another publication,
which wasn't particularly fond of us, say that we were teaching

2021]

THE PRESS, WHISTLEBLOWERS

257

reporters to act like drug dealers. It was a little unfair, but just a
little. So, all of Heidi’s points are on point there that it is easier
for the government to find people. It's easier for the government
to do it without us. I often wonder why that doesn't add up to
why don't we have a shield law. Since they don't need us, they
might as well get some credit for protecting us.
Papandrea: David, I would just like to add, in addition to
the great points that Heidi and David M. have made, I also think
there might be, and I'm just guessing, some anxiety within the
executive branch of their ability to control all of the information,
not just since 9/11, but especially since 9/11, just the explosion
of the national security state and the number of secrets and who
has access to the secrets. The leak prosecutions are one very
powerful, but not the only, tool that the executive branch has
been trying to wield to keep control over national security
secrets. So, for example, when Trump took office, he made
everyone dump their cell phones on the table while they worked
in the White House or something like that. There’s been a
crackdown on the ability of government employees to talk to the
press, restrictions on when they can do that and the need to get
authorization and so on. So, there's a lot of other things going
on, and I think these leak prosecutions are part and parcel of
those of those efforts.
McCraw: And it's really driven by overclassification in a
lot of ways. A lot of things that are treated as leaked classified
information should never been classified in the first place. As
Justice Potter Stewart said in the Pentagon Papers case,
overclassification leads to carelessness and cynicism.13 I see that
all the time. You have five million people plus with security
clearances. And, as I now have hot keyed into most of the briefs
that I write, we have the famous quote from President Obama:
“There's classified, and then there's classified.”14 You know,
there's stuff that's really secret, and there's stuff that we just say
is secret. How is a reporter, how is the source, supposed to deal
with that when the President of the United States is telling Fox
13

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart J., concurring)
(“For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated
by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.”).
14
Michael D. Shear, Obama Says Hillary Clinton Wouldn’t Intentionally Endanger U.S.
with Emails, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/us/politics/obama-hillary-clinton-emailfox-news.html.
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News that classification is not at the margins but is, in a much
larger swath, a joke?
Ardia: Heidi, I really like your point about the
normalization, and part of this is cultural. One of the other things
that the Reporters Committee study shows is that the outcomes
in these prosecutions has shown a substantial increase in the
length of sentences that the courts have been imposing.15 One
thing you might take from that is that the information that's being
disclosed is more damaging and, therefore, warrants a longer
sentence. Though, it’s hard to see that. It could just be that what
society expects and accepts has changed over time since we
lionized Ellsberg. We don't have that same view as a society, and
that could be affecting some of this.
Kitrosser: Yeah, in terms of the sentencing lengths, I
think there are many things going on. But two things that come
to mind are, one, in some cases, given the sweeping nature of the
Espionage Act, given that there is no possibility of a public
interest defense or even an opportunity to really seriously
challenge how much if at all national security was at risk,
increasingly, you end up having situations where people plea out
because they don't really have an alternative. Then, you have no
real oversight, or at least you are lacking oversight, with respect
to the sentence. So, one thing that comes to mind, for example,
is when Shamai Leibowitz, who was one of the first people
prosecuted under Obama, was sentenced, the sentencing judge
said something that was really stunning. He said something like,
I don't even know what was leaked, but I know it was some
information.16
Then, on the other hand, when you have judges
attempting to do comparative analysis, for purposes of
sentencing propriety, of past sentences under the Espionage Act,
you then run into this problem that the Espionage Act was, of
course, predominately designed for classic spying. So, then you
have the propriety of sentencing someone for leaking
information about troubling FBI surveillance practices to The
Intercept, [and you’re] comparing that to someone who was
sentenced for leaking information to Russian spies during the
15

Nichols, supra note 5.
Josh Gerstein, Judge gives leaker 20 months, but isn’t sure why, POLITICO (May 24,
2010), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2010/05/judge-givesleaker-20-months-but-isnt-sure-why-027212.
16
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Cold War. So, that's among the issues that we have floating
around.
Ardia: And obviously, the motivation of leakers varies,
and we'll come back to this question of whether their intent
matters in terms of First Amendment analysis. But, it clearly is
the case, when we think about the relationship between the panel
earlier today and the panel this afternoon, that in the national
security space, other than whistleblowers, it's very difficult for
the public to get information about what the government is doing
here. For some of these folks who are willing to put their freedom
on the line, many of them knowing that the ability to cover their
tracks is limited, but they still go forward and do that. What are
we to make of that? That there are people within the government
who feel strongly enough about disclosing the information that
they're willing to put their freedom on the line to do that? And I
throw that out to anyone.
Schulz: Maybe I could jump in. This goes, really I think,
to one of the points in the paper that Heidi and I worked on, and
Heidi has been dealing with this issue for over a decade, which
is the need for some sort of First Amendment-type protection to
be built into Espionage Act prosecutions. As Heidi mentioned,
right now, there's no sense that the First Amendment applies at
all. And that just can't be as the Espionage Act has morphed from
what was intended into a quasi-official secrets act. And, just to
go back over a little bit of the history so people understand the
point that Heidi was making, this was passed during the First
World War.17 It essentially has not been materially amended in
the last 104 years. But it was intended to reach spies, and in
World War I and World War II, they were focused on enemyto-enemy information with a few early exceptions with
pamphleteers.
When Congress passed it in 1917, President Wilson
wanted some language in about how it could reach the press and
leaks to the press, and Congress wouldn't do it. When they
amended the statute and modified it in 1950 to separate out
what's now Sections (d) and (e) of 793––to separate out people
who have information because they got it from a government
versus people who are the recipients of leaks––there, again, was
concern that this would have an impact on the press and their
17

The Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 22, 46
and 50 U.S.C.).
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ability to report on what the government is doing. Language was
put into the bill that said nothing here is intended to allow
censorship of the press. And Congress, again, seemed to think
that was sufficient and that people kind of understood you
weren't supposed to use this law to go after the press.
That all has changed, starting with Morison, but I think
really accelerated after 9/11. And I just want to underscore a
point Mary-Rose was making on top of Heidi’s good points. I do
think 9/11 changed a lot. It changed how deferential judges are
willing to be, their concern about the impact of getting it wrong.
And to David McCraw’s point about “classified and classified,”
I think that goes right to some points that were made this
morning that a problem that we're dealing with right now in
trying to figure out how to solve this issue is that judges are
unwilling to step in and do this. So, when you have a leak
investigation, if someone wants to say, “well, this wasn't really
an important leak, you know yes, it was classified, but there was
no harm,” judges don't want to hear that. They don't want to get
involved. They don't want to play the role that they need to play
if we're going have some kind of a viable thing.
One other thing which ties into where we are and how
you get the First Amendment, the point has been made that
technology allows the government to find people very easily
now. I think it's not coincidental that in this explosion of
prosecutions in the last ten, fifteen years, there hasn't been a
single reporter called to testify. In fact, there hasn't been a single
reporter subpoenaed except for James Risen, who fought it and
fought it and fought it under the Obama administration,
ultimately lost in the Fourth Circuit,18 and then the government
didn't call him.19 While that's a sign of the fact that technology
means you don't need the reporter to identify the leaker anymore,
it also has the effect of removing a layer of First Amendment
protection that used to exist. Back in the old days if the
government wanted to prosecute a leaker, they had to find the
leaker. And, as one of the Obama administration lawyers
mentioned in a similar speech, in the old days you either had to
get the leaker to confess or you had to get the recipient of the leak
to tell you who it was. If you wanted to do that, you had to go in
18

United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 2013).
Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-reporter-jamesrisen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html?.
19
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and, in most parts of the country, you'd have to deal with the
press who would be asserting a First Amendment defense not to
tell you who their source was. And the judge would have to do
some sort of balancing of public interest. That's all gone. If you
don't need the press under the Espionage Act, there's no notion
of public interest balancing. So, we're at an important threshold.
And one other minor point is we really have transformed
this into an official secrets act. Back in the 1990s, in the Clinton
administration, Congress actually passed an official secrets act to
deal with these types of leaks in a way the Espionage Act wasn't,
and President Clinton vetoed it because he was concerned about
the First Amendment implications. In response to that, it was at
the very end of his term, Congress comes back the next session
and the republicans did not push to put it back in and have
President Bush sign it. Instead, they said, well, let's study the
issue, and Attorney General Ashcroft came back two years later
with his report. He says, I think the Espionage Act gives me all
the powers I need to go after leakers, and they have now taken
that and run with it all the way up to the point where, if you
followed the extradition of Julian Assange in England, one of the
things that government had to prove to get him extradited was
that the crime he was being charged with here would be a crime
in England. The judge goes through at great length the
arguments our Department of Justice was making that the
Espionage Act crimes that he was charged with are equivalent to
the Official Secrets Act in England.20 So, it's that confirmation
we've come full circle, and this is being used as an official secrets
act in a way it was never intended.
Ardia: So clearly, David McCraw, the explosion in these
investigations and prosecutions is an effort to stem the flow of
this information, to stop these leaks from taking place. From
your perspective, has that been successful? Are you seeing this
impact national security reporting in a way that makes it more
difficult for your reporters to do their work?
McCraw: I think I'm professionally required to answer
that, yes. Even though the empirical proof of that is completely
nonexistent. Anecdotally, the reporters will tell you that they
have sources that don’t talk to them. Many of those aren't
20

United States v. Assange [2021] EWHC (QB) 2 [30]-[51] (Eng.)
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/USA-v-Assangejudgment-040121.pdf.

262

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVI EW

[Vol. 19

necessarily national security. They may be White House sources
and Justice Department sources that aren’t national security
sources as we think of them. When this question comes up––is
there a chilling effect caused by the prosecutions––it takes me
back to the different way the chilling effect was discussed in N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan21 in 1964 and then in Branzburg v. Hayes22 eight
years later. In Sullivan, they assume there's a chilling effect from
libel suits.23 They take that as an article of faith that if libel suits
are too easy, that the press is going to be chilled. You then get to
Branzburg and the majority opinion spends a great deal of time
saying, well, look, they don't have any proof of this, if they make
their record maybe we’ll feel differently.24 And the dissent, takes
them on on that.25 But, it really frames how much a chilling effect
in all of these areas touching the press is in many ways more
religious belief than empirical belief, and I'm a religious man on
this one. I do think it is a chilling effect.
One thing that makes this hard is what kind of reporting
we're talking about. What's the scope of the reporting, the fabric
of reporting, that's likely affected? In my experience, the
WikiLeaks, the Snowden type of information drop is the rare
exception, even the kind of things you're seeing in some of the
prosecutions where there are suspicious activity reports from
Treasury, where there's a volume of documents. Most of the
national security reporting that I'm familiar with through my
reporters deals with a much more granular, mosaic approach to
reporting. They're hearing it from trusted sources in bits and
pieces. And, that has continued, I think, in part, because it's done
by very high-level people in many cases, and, in part, because it
doesn't involve documents. So, there's also sort of an ambiguity
about what is classified. You're not looking at a document that
has a stamp on it.
And I think it's important to think about the prosecutions.
By my count––and, of course, getting the count right is always
hard because you've got to know what is media and what's
national security––but, if you look at the seven prosecutions
during the Trump years besides Assange, [there have been] three
people who leaked to The Intercept, two who leaked to BuzzFeed,
21

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
23
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278–79.
24
See id. 693–95.
25
See id. at 732–34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
22
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and one to WikiLeaks. The other one was NBC. I think that
pattern is telling in that it tends to be low-level government
employees and media outlets that share none of whatever
remains of a good feeling of institutional government toward
mainstream media. So, I don't think that's random, and I don't
think those reporters at those sites are sloppy or more careless. I
do think that they're seen as more likely targets.
I guess the last thing I’d say about this goes back to my
overclassification point. There's so much that's classified, and so
much of what's going on here is putting bits and pieces together
to make a story that I'm not always convinced that the leaker
even knows that he or she is the leaker. A few years ago,
attorneys for a person who ultimately was prosecuted came to
my office and said, can't your reporter help us out here? Can't
your reporter say that my guy wasn't the one? And I couldn't
decide whether their client was lying to them or their client just
didn't understand that in conversations classified information
comes out. And that goes, in part, to the point David was making
earlier, that you have to understand the motivation, what drives
people to leak and what would stop them from doing it.
Obviously, if you're not even sure you were the source, it's very
hard to see the effect of the law to deter that kind of conduct.
Ardia: We've been hinting at the First Amendment's
operation in this space, and I want to move now to explore that
a little bit more directly. One of the things that's quite shocking
for someone who looks into the court's view of the First
Amendment issues here is that there is a dearth of appellate
decisions. There's one appellate court decision from 1988, we
mentioned United States v. Morison,26 the decision by the Fourth
Circuit. That’s it, that’s the extent of the appellate treatment of
the First Amendment issues under the Espionage Act. That's
rather shocking David Schulz, why is that? That was a long time
ago.
Schulz: Yeah, it was a long time ago, and that was
actually the very first case involving a leak to the press that
actually went to trial and led to a verdict. As Heidi mentioned,
there were a couple earlier, one in the 50s and one in the 70s that
kind of fizzled and didn't go forward. And it's an interesting case
because the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction on a very bad
26

844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988).
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set of facts. In terms of trying to frame the First Amendment or
the public interest involved, the facts weren't particularly
compelling. Mr. Morison worked for the Navy.27 He was trying
to get a job with Jane’s Defence Weekly, a big defense magazine,
and so he leaked a spy photograph showing the capabilities of
U.S. spy plane cameras that we're able to pick out very small
things on the ground.28 This was like something our government
considered very secret, keeping concealed the technical
capabilities that they have. And he leaked a photo to Jane’s, and
the intent, you know the notion that he knew he was doing
something wrong, not only was he trying to get a job when he
did this, but he put it in an envelope to the editor that was
anonymous.29 He physically cut off of the photograph the secret
designations and sent it in a separate envelop, so, in theory, he
couldn't get caught.30 And how did he get caught? This goes back
to the whole thing about the reporter's privilege. He got caught
because of old fashioned, gumshoe detective work. The
Department of Justice went to Jane’s, got the photo, there was
not a reporter's privilege issue over in England, and they found
his fingerprint on it.31
So, they had him, they had his bad intent––this
knowledge that he was doing something wrong. So, he’s
convicted, and when he's making these First Amendment
arguments that the Espionage Act doesn't have a sufficient intent
requirement and that there are other problems with it, the court
is able to say, well, to the extent we should be worried about an
intent, we have enough bad intent here.32 And they don't really
grapple further with the First Amendment issues. One of the
reasons, which Heidi goes into at great length in our paper, is
that they view this not as a First Amendment problem, but as a
theft of government property, which changes the First
Amendment analysis.33 But, even in that context, two of the
judges concur separately to say, you know, the First Amendment
concerns would be different here if we were going after Jane's
Weekly rather than going after the leaker because we have the bad

27

Id.
Id. at 1060–62.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
Id. at 1061–62.
32
See id. at 1068–70.
33
Id. at 1068.
28

2021]

THE PRESS, WHISTLEBLOWERS

265

intent and we have other things.34 Now, that's the state of the law
in terms of it.
The next time that the government went after someone
for leaking was the AIPAC case35 that Mary-Rose talked about
this morning. It involved a leak to two lobbyists for the American
Israel Political Action Committee.36 There was a lot of concern
then because if they were responsible––they were people who
received information, not leakers––then it raises all these same
issues about what's the First Amendment protection for the
press? Are they in any different posture than the press? So, it was
intensely litigated at the district court level. The judge handling
the case ultimately concluded, well, I'm going to read the
Espionage Act to say that the government will have the burden
of proving here that this information that was passed on to the
defendants, which they then passed on to the government of
Israel, that they're going to have to show that the defendants had
a bad intent when they passed it on.37 That was a switch in the
law, because the government's argument had been and has
always been that the language of the Espionage Act only requires
them to show that this was national security information and that
a reasonable person would understand that it had the potential
to cause harm to United States or to aid an enemy. You don't
have to have the intent. It's just sort of like a negligence standard.
Anybody would have known not to pass this on. And the judge
said that's not good enough given the First Amendment issues
here––you're going to have to show an actual intent.38 The
government then dropped the case,39 basically saying we don't
think we can meet that burden.
So, even that First Amendment requirement in terms of
how the act gets applied hasn't been reviewed on appeal.
Although in an interlocutory motion dealing with some
evidentiary rulings, the Fourth Circuit went out of its way to
34

See id. at 1085 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“This prosecution was not an attempt to
apply the espionage statute to the press for either the receipt or publication of
classified materials.”); see also id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring) (“I agree with
Judge Wilkinson's differing view that the first amendment issues raised by Morison
are real and substantial . . . .”).
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United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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Id. at 607–08.
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See id. at 626–27.
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See id. at 626–27, 640–41.
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See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, U.S. to Drop Spy Case Against Pro-Israel
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2009),
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suggest that the district court got it wrong.40 So, there's a reason
to believe that even that level of protection doesn't exist from the
First Amendment. Why we don't have other decisions, I think it
was touched upon earlier, I think a lot of these plead out. A lot
of them go in other directions, and the fact is from a protection
of the press point of view, the sort of concerns David McCraw
would have, there hasn't been anyone else other than the two
AIPAC lobbyists who were recipients of information who've
been charged with violating the Espionage Act. It's always the
leaker. The leaker is a problem under the First Amendment, but
it’s one step removed from going after a journalist, which is why
now Julian Assange is such a big issue because he's the next one
in line who's been accused of being the recipient of information
rather than the leaker.
Ardia: And I’m hoping we’ll get to Assange in a moment
or two. I do want to ask Heidi, after Morison the district courts
have been quick to reject First Amendment arguments at the
threshold under a theory that it’s conduct and not speech.
Someone mentioned earlier, this is thievery. The court says
you’ve stolen something. The First Amendment doesn’t have
anything to say about that. Is that right under the First
Amendment? What is going on in the courts with regard to even
being willing to address First Amendment issues?
Kitrosser: So, I think there are huge things going on. Part
of the story is national security exceptionalism, right? We see
that not only in the classified information context, but in other
contexts. In the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project41
there we saw, in a different context, the Supreme Court was very,
very quick to say, oh, strict scrutiny, which is normally such a
punishing standard, is very easily met in the context of an aid
organization that could be deemed to be providing material
support to terrorists when they engage in training, etc.,42 for
reasons that were clearly steeped in national security
exceptionalism. So, that's part of the story, quite simply. That
manifests itself in these cases as this argument that there really
isn't even a First Amendment concern here and specifically this
argument that, in so far as classified information is involved,
conveying the information is no longer simply speaking in a way
that triggers First Amendment concerns, but is really more akin
40
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to some kind of harmful action, more akin to theft. So, that's part
of the story.
I also think part of the story is simply, again, that these
things kind of build on each other. Once the court said that in
Morison then it becomes sort of easier to take, what I think is
probably, a judicial intuition that, again, there's just something
special about national security and cloak it in that [analogy] of
thievery. I also do wonder, and this is just me speculating, but I
do wonder to what extent the thievery analogy took hold because
the facts of Morison lent themselves to that a little more readily
because it involved not only a tangible document, but as they've
said, it involved somebody literally taking the document off of
their coworker’s desk, cutting around the edges, putting it in an
envelope, and mailing it away. It wasn't even a photocopy, they
actually took the tangible document. So, I wonder to what extent
that lent itself further to the analogy. Then other courts just ran
with it in a way that was compatible with their intuitions because
of national security exceptionalism.
All of that said, I don't think it's right. I mean, it's taken
hold. And, obviously, several courts have sort of run with it. So,
it's “right” in the sense that a number of courts have sort of
embedded it into doctrine. I don't think it is right, though. I think
that the minute we take a few steps back and say, well, wait a
minute, somebody might have stamped the words classified on
this, at least when we're talking about tangible documents, but if
we just put that aside for a minute, what are we talking about?
We're talking about information that involves foreign affairs and
involves matters of public concern. And we're talking about
somebody conveying the information. Now, that's not to say
they should necessarily prevail. Certainly not to say that they're
absolutely protected. No speaker is absolutely protected.
Everyone is subject to potential limits compatible with First
Amendment standards. But the conveyance of information that
under ordinary First Amendment law, punishing that on the
basis that the content conveyed is dangerous raises all kinds of
alarm bells and should be triggering pretty strict standards.
Nonetheless, under this doctrine, under the thievery analogy,
etc., we have this world where, in fact, the classification stamp
just takes you into a different universe. The First Amendment
rules don't apply. So, I think that is very problematic, but that is
the reasoning a number of courts have run with.
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Papandrea: I just wanted to underscore the disconnect
that Heidi is illustrating between the limited case law in this area
and the rest of the Supreme Court's doctrine. When David
McCraw a moment ago was mentioning N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
we have this robust commitment to the discussion about public
affairs and public officials. And we see this in a number of the
Supreme Court's opinions. Everyone agrees leaks are not a good
scenario. No one wants leakers to be the way that we find out
about information. It's a very flawed system, but a lot of people
agree that we have no better system. To say that there is no First
Amendment issue is ridiculous. It doesn't mean, as Heidi said,
that every leaker should prevail.
As I mentioned this morning, certainly there are some
secrets that need to be kept secret, but there is a real disconnect
here with our commitment to the robust discussion of public
issues. And I'll just highlight something that I prodded the
panelists this morning with about whether there actually should
be a First Amendment right of access to this information that
may help leakers. The idea that actually the public has a right to
hear this information is a longshot to ever get accepted, but if it
ever were accepted, it’s like the structural value of the First
Amendment in informing our democracy. Heidi is nodding
because she's written a lot about that, so I'm really just borrowing
her ideas. But I think that there's a lot of just, again, disconnect
with our commitment to informed public discussion.
McCraw: I just wanted to underscore what Heidi, MaryRose, and Dave were saying about the judges essentially
surrendering any role in this process. The Second Circuit had a
criminal case decided in 2019 where they drop a footnote
thanking these security agencies, the intelligence agencies, for
helping them redact their decision and saying that they had
neither the expertise nor the inclination as a court to second
guess them.43 I remember when The New York Times and the
ACLU sued over the targeted killing memo, which we won, in
part. The lawyer for the ACLU and I sat in the Second Circuit
courtroom while the court met privately with the lawyers for the
government. We later found out, because it's in the decision, in
43
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that secret session the government refused to identify one of the
people who was at the session with the judges, that there was
somebody whose identity was classified. And the Second Circuit
judges were unable to convince the attorneys for the Justice
Department that it would be a nice thing to identify everybody
in the room to the judges. In the opinion, the Second Circuit
criticized them for that. But he's never identified, and we've seen
over and over that kind of deference taking hold. It goes to what,
I think, Steve Vladeck was saying this morning, that essentially
it's a single branch of government that is deciding these issues.
And it happens to be the branch that has the most investment in
hiding embarrassment, hiding unlawfulness, and hiding a lot of
things that the public should know.
Schulz: If I could just say a point on that to follow up,
because, Mary-Rose, I think your point about having a
constitutional right of access is a really interesting point. We’ve
litigated the issue of the conflict between classification and a
constitutional access right in court cases. One that went to the
D.C. Circuit, about five years ago, arose out of a Guantanamo
habeas hearing where certain videotapes that were classified
were admitted into evidence, and The New York Times and other
press organizations went in to get it, asserting a constitutional
right of access.44 Basically, the argument we made was, look,
there's no question that the right of access applies here.45 It's a
court record. There's solid precedent in the D.C. Circuit. And the
district court judge agreed with us that there was a right of access.
And we said, therefore judge, you have to decide whether it
meets the Press-Enterprise standard, a heightened First
Amendment standard for the government to keep it secret. The
district court judge said, yes, you're right, said they haven't met
the standard, and ordered it released.46
On appeal, you have a train wreck, right? You have a
three-judge decision, one of which says there is no right of access
to classified information ever, even in the court,47 which to me
raises lots of separation of powers questions. Can the executive
order a trial to be done in secret because they want to have
classified information? The court has no role? Another judge said
the district got it right on the legal analysis, but on the facts here
44
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it should still be secret.48 So, you had two judges to reverse. And
the third one said, I can't even tell if the right of access should
apply here because the teaching the Supreme Court has given us
is too ambiguous.49 Like at what level do we decide the history
and the logic? So, it's a train wreck, and it hasn't been decided. I
think the problem we face, it goes back to Steve Vladeck’s
problem. Judges don't want to decide these issues. And,
ultimately, I think if you push the constitutional right of access
and give it to a judge, even if they accept the existence of the
right, the legal analysis is going to come down to, “well, as a
judge, what I have to decide is is it properly classified? Because
if it's properly classified, then there's a threat to national security,
and I should defer to the executive.” That turns out to be exactly
the same standard under FOIA. You're entitled to get it under
FOIA unless it's properly classified, and we've seen how far that
has gotten us. So, we have an institutional problem with judges
who are not asserting their right to look at this stuff. It goes back
to what David McCraw was saying, there's so much
classification, and there's so much stuff that even the executive
branch recognizes doesn't really need to be kept secret. Judges
are unwilling to look at that or to consider the importance to the
public of knowing the information. There's no balance that
comes into play.
Ardia: So, I want to make sure we get a chance to talk a
little bit about the Assange prosecution. But, I have a segue into
that, and that is the phrase that David and Heidi use in their
article about this whole edifice being built on “a house of sand.”50
And now we've got a storm coming through, and it's this
prosecution against Julian Assange. Obama, under a lot of
pressure, declined to bring a case against Julian Assange, and the
Trump administration decided to go forward with it. I was really
struck in the earlier panel that they excluded from those charges
anything related to the DNC email hack and disclosure. So, that
may tell us something about the thinking within the Trump
administration. But, Mary-Rose, what do we make of the Trump
administration's willingness to plow forward with this, and what
might we expect to come?
Papandrea: Well, I think I tipped my hand pretty strongly
this morning about this case. You know, I do think it's part and
48
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parcel of the Trump administration's attack on the press. And I
know that's a bit controversial because many people don't regard
Julian Assange as part of the press. I know early on––I think
things have changed, David McCraw can speak more to this––
the more traditional mainstream media really has distanced itself
from WikiLeaks in many ways, and they are different in some
ways. But the problem is they're not really different in currently
any legally recognizable ways. So, for example, we have a press
clause in the First Amendment, but it hasn't really been given
any meaning. If it were, we'd have to define who the press is, and
I don't know whether Julian Assange and WikiLeaks would or
wouldn't fall within that definition. It would be difficult to draw
a line that would distinguish WikiLeaks and Julian Assange
from the mainstream traditional media and journalists. They are
collecting information. They're disseminating information. It's
public information. There's value to a lot of this information. So,
if a prosecution against Julian Assange goes forward––and,
again, I'll be anxious to see what the Biden administration's view
is on this––it very much threatens the press because it is not a
good set of facts.
I don't think Julian Assange is very sympathetic. It
doesn't help that he's an outsider. He's not part of The New York
Times. People question his motives. And there also is this
atmospheric hacking and all of that. So, I would expect very bad
law. The case that the press would want would be salutary. They
revealed government wrongdoing of NSA hacking or that the
NSA is following all Americans, for example, like the Snowden
leaks or something like that, something where there was clear
public interest that was revealed. And through established news
outlets, you know, not through WikiLeaks, then we might have
a chance. I don't think it would be for sure that the press would
win or the leaker would win, but a chance that the courts would
recognize First Amendment protection for publishing national
security information of great public value. This question has
been left open since Pentagon Papers. Pentagon Papers was a
prior restraint case and didn't answer the question of whether the
press could be held criminally responsible, after the fact.51 So, I
hate to see this prosecution go forward because I fear what would
happen, because the DOJ’s assertions that Assange is not a
journalist do not reassure me in any way whatsoever.

51
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Ardia: Bad facts led to Morison. We could see this just
steamrolling. Does everyone else share Mary-Rose’s pessimism?
Kitrosser: Yeah, I would say that I do. I, too, am eager
to see what the Biden administration does, and, hopefully, they
will decide to follow suit with the approach the Obama
administration had taken and just decline to go forward with it
and dismiss it. But I share Mary-Rose’s concerns absolutely as to
what would happen if they do go forward with it. It's potentially
a perfect storm of this very unsympathetic set of facts that gives
courts an opportunity to say, and perhaps tell themselves even,
that this is different. This is not The New York Times combined
with national security exceptionalism, and [there are] a lot of bad
precedent from other contexts, from leaker context for example,
that they could import into this. Not to mention some of those
troubling concurring opinions that I think were referenced this
morning from the Pentagon Papers case. So, I would be very
concerned if the Biden administration does decide to go forward
with this.
McCraw: If I could just follow up on that, and MaryRose will remember the last time we did this show, it was in
Pasadena for the Ninth Circuit, and I got induced into saying
nice things about Julian Assange, which isn't easy. And my
reward was to be quoted in his civil brief when he was sued by
the DNC, which I wasn't talking about. So, I'm going to not step
into that particular sinkhole today. I'm not going to speak about
the DNC hack and what WikiLeaks did or didn't do. And this
will go back to 2010, which is what the indictment’s about. I
think the interesting thing about this case, or one of the
interesting things about this case is that the point that Mary-Rose
highlighted, is when the time comes, if a prosecution ever goes
forward in the United States, will the mainstream media be
writing an amicus brief? Will they feel the need to wrap their
arms around a person who reviles them and they return the favor,
in large part?
What was interesting, as you'll recall, was in the first
indictment, the only charge that dealt with Julian Assange was
assistance given to Private Manning in a failed attempt to get
more classified information through disguising of a computer
hack.52 And if you look at the press coverage after that, if you
52
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look at the editorials around the country, very few mainstream
media editorial pages said that's cool, that's perfectly allowable,
that should be protected by the First Amendment. To the
contrary, they said over and over again, real journalists don't do
that. They don't help their sources hack. They don't help their
sources engage in computer intrusion. It was when the first
superseding indictment comes out, and Assange is now charged
not only with his role in aiding that failed attempt at accessing a
secure database, but is actually charged with publishing
information,53 that the editorial pages turned very sharply and
realized the problem that this kind of prosecution would cause.
As Dave Schulz said earlier, it had been an established hallmark
of the Espionage Act prosecutions that they were done on
government employees and contractors, not on those who
receive information and publish it. So, I think it's a hard case
because of the facts. But I think it's going to be very hard for
people on the mainstream media, established press side of the
world to not see some peril if the prosecution goes forward on
the publishing aspect of that indictment.
Ardia: David Schulz, you may be drafting one of these
amicus briefs on behalf of your clinic.
Schulz: Yeah, and, you know, this goes to one of things
Heidi and I grappled with in the paper that was written for the
symposium, how do you factor in the First Amendment? I do
think that, at least absent some congressional action to change
the law or to address some of these issues, there will come a day
when there is going to be a case against a recipient of information
where these issues are going to be resolved. Is there a First
Amendment defense? How do the courts deal with a recipient?
And Assange may be that case. But I don't think that there is
going to be, well, maybe I should watch what I say here, or I’ll
end up in David McCraw’s sinkhole. But I think it's very difficult
to come up with a factual distinction that will carry the day to
say what Julian Assange did is not what journalists do. It's
different in degree, maybe, but not in kind. And maybe the
degree is a way to deal with it. But ultimately, there's going to
have to be some way of importing the First Amendment
concerns here, and it may be the kind of line drawing that we're
going to advocate. At some point, you cross the line between
53
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being a recipient of information and being an active participant
in the wrongdoing.
The example I would point to is there are some cases back
in the beginning of this century, I think, I can’t remember maybe
it was in the 90s. But a case called Bartnicki that went to the
Supreme Court about whether someone who was the recipient
of information that had been illegally obtained through an
eavesdrop, listening in on someone's wireless phone,
[committed] a crime.54 The law that made that a crime said if you
receive information that has been illegally obtained, you are also
guilty if you further disseminate it.55 It went up to the Supreme
Court, and they said, well, that goes too far because there are
First Amendment protections.56
But then, following Bartnicki, there were two cases,
McDermott57 and Peavy,58 where this issue was litigated again. In
McDermott, they allowed the liability for different reasons
because there were ethical issues involving a congressman.59 In
Peavy, the situation was that a reporter had been the recipient of
some of this information.60 A neighbor recorded his neighbor
talking about some insurance scam dealing with a local school
district.61 And the reporter said, this is really interesting stuff––
it's newsworthy, involves the school board, but I need more, will
you keep recording?62 Even in light of Bartnicki about the
innocent recipient being protected under the First Amendment,
the Fifth Circuit said no, you became an active participant in
this.63
And there was a case in the Second Circuit that shows the
same principle following the flight T.W.A. 800 crash.64 That was
a big thing because there were a lot of conspiracy theories that it
had been shot down by a U.S. missile or a hand-to-ground
something, a plane that crashed right after takeoff from Kennedy
Airport. In the course of the investigation of that, a reporter was
54
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talking to someone who was working on the reconstruction of
the aircraft in a hangar on Long Island and was being fed
information that, yes, we found the remnants of an explosive or
a missile.65 So, this is proving the conspiracy. And the reporter
said, well, that's not good enough––I can't go on your say so, but
if you will get me a piece of this seat fabric that has some of this
on that, I can independently test, then maybe we'll have a story.66
The reporter was prosecuted under a law that says it's a crime to
interfere, and where they drew the line was he became an active
participant when he asked his source to go back and get him the
fabric.67 So, it may be that we’re going have to draw that sort of
a line and that we can push Assange safely to that he got too
involved. There are allegations against him of aiding, abetting,
and conspiring to do a whole series of things that arguably go
beyond what a reporter does. That may be that the safest exit
ramp if this all comes to a head.
Kitrosser: If I could just jump in, David A., for a second.
It strikes me in thinking about this Assange question that one of
the reasons that the stakes are so high here is because of the way
that we have traditionally accepted a really sharp line between
source and distributor. And because there are so few cases here,
that's not a line that’s deeply embedded in the case law so much
as it's a line that I think has been sort of respected in practice
with, for example, the Department of Justice, until Assange,
declining to prosecute distributors, et cetera. Of course, cases in
the doctrine like Bartnicki suggest that we're much less inclined
to find recipients blameworthy. And although I do think it's
warranted to draw some line between the two, I do think one of
the things that is so troubling about the spate of Espionage Act
prosecutions against the leakers themselves in the last twenty
years or so is the sense that they essentially have no protections,
which is one of the problems that we were talking about in the
first half of this conversation. So, I do think the two issues are
somewhat tied together, even if there should be some different
level of protection. I think one thing that puts so much pressure
on the Assange case is this notion that if Assange falls into or if
the press generally falls into a category where they're “no better”
or treated not much differently than the leakers themselves, then
all bets are off. And part of that stems from the fact that the
leakers at present are accorded virtually no protection, just to
65
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highlight how there is a real connection between the two things.
So, I think that's something that's important to keep in mind as
well as we keep our eyes on what's going on with Assange.
Ardia: So, I do want to ask if you could wave your magic
wand and craft the rule that a court would apply in the Assange
case and in cases in the future that are brought not against the
leaders, but against––and maybe this line is a fuzzy one, as Heidi
points out––entities that look like media entities, that look like
journalistic entities, what would what rule would you come up
with? What do you think would comply with the First
Amendment and be workable for the courts to apply in these
kinds of cases? I’ll let any of you be the first to take a stab at that.
My guess is you've already thought about this.
Kitrosser: Well, I'll just jump in really quickly. Although
I was just stressing the connection between the leakers and the
recipients, I don't know that I would make the standard exactly
the same. I would be inclined to provide meaningful protections
to leakers but, nonetheless, probably more protection to the
recipients, such as the press. So, when we're talking about the
press, when we're talking about the distributor, I would be
nervous really about any lessening of the ordinary First
Amendment protections that already apply outside of the
classified information context, particularly given, as David
McCraw has been stressing, the earthshaking scope of the
classification system. If I could wave a magic wand, I would be
disinclined to create a special rule that demands anything less.
Ardia: So, you're thinking, Heidi, an intent requirement?
A balancing of the public interest?
Kitrosser: Yes, I'm thinking probably strict scrutiny, but
meaningfully applied, not a Holder vs. Humanitarian Law Project
version. And this isn't really a fit for the incitement context, but
perhaps borrowing elements from the incitement context. I think
intent probably should be a part of it, and not watered-down
intent but intent to actually create the national security disaster
that government is prosecuting on the basis of.
Ardia: David, David, or Mary Rose want to weigh in on
this?
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Papandrea: Just to piggyback on Heidi, no surprise, I
would actually, maybe, go a little farther and embrace the
Pentagon Papers standard. Even though Pentagon Papers was a
prior restraint case,68 I would embrace that same standard, which
arguably is higher than even strict scrutiny depending on how
you think about it. But risk of imminent and serious damage to
national security, and not only public interest, that would be part
of it if it's a third-party publishing. I think the intent standard,
and I've argued this elsewhere, can help us. Rather than try to
distinguish among publishers and try to figure out who's a
journalist, who's not a journalist, maybe we use the press clause–
–I'm very much opposed to that. But I do think that intent can be
helpful in protecting those who truly are trying to inform the
American people rather than those who are trying to aid our
enemies. How that works in practice, I appreciate that’s tricky,
but that would be the way I would go.
Schulz: I could go next, because I agree. I would have
two things I would do if I had a magic wand. One is to have some
sort of intent criteria, whether it's Heidi’s or Mary-Rose’s, that
there would be a burden to show an intent to harm at the liability
phase on the government, but that the public interest would have
to come in either as a defense by the defendant or at the
sentencing phase, in either phase. Some sort of balance along the
lines of what Judge Tatel tried to do with the reporter's privilege,
where you were balancing when you have a leak investigation,
how do you apply the reporter's privilege? He said, well, we've
got to balance the importance of the leak against the importance
of whatever the crime was and decide. There will be some cases
where it's more important for the people to know what was
leaked than for the government to prosecute the crime, and I
think some sort of balance like that has to come in, which is
totally missing at the moment, where a judge is going to have to
weigh the importance. I would say that the sorts of things we
learned from Snowden––the wiretapping, surveillance, all the
things we didn't know are going on––are orders of magnitude
different in terms of their public importance from what was
disclosed in WikiLeaks. Somehow that needs to factor into both
the liability phase as an affirmative defense by the leaker, that
this was something the public had a right to know, and at the
sentencing stage, potentially.
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McCraw: There's not much I could add to all of that,
other than I'd like to underscore Heidi's point, that I would not
look forward to seeing a tampering with the First Amendment
standard for the recipients or publisher. I think between Bartnicki
and what can be drawn from the Pentagon Paper decisions, the
protection is strong and right. I think for the government
employee who provides the information, there should be an
opportunity to argue public interest, probably along the way that
Dave Schulz is talking about with harm versus interest.
Ardia: Ashley did you have some questions from the
virtual audience?
Fox: Yes. I think we can start with this one continuing
our discussion about the Assange case. If we do see this Assange
case go the route of drawing a line when reporters can get too
involved in encouraging sources to bring them information, as
Professor Schulz suggested could happen, how many problems
would that create for investigative journalists as far as feeling that
they are limited and, maybe, they have to sit back and wait for
sources to come to them as opposed to going out to sources
themselves? If anyone wants to take that one.
Papandrea: I volunteer David McCraw to say what you
would think, and then I'll offer my thoughts. But given that you
see this upfront with your journalists, what would happen?
McCraw: Yeah, I think that this is one of the problems
with the way the Assange indictment is written. Encouraging
people, encouraging sources to provide documents is part and
parcel of what journalists do. This idea that there's only complete
passivity, only the Trump tax returns coming in a brown
envelope to Sue Craig’s mailbox, if that's the only thing being
protected, not a lot's being protected. And it's not actually good
for journalism because getting something like that in a brown
envelope with no markings on it is great legally and awful
journalistically. How do you know it's authentic? So, I think that
that there is a broad definition of routine newsgathering that
should remain protected, and that includes asking people for
proof of what they're saying, if somebody tells you something,
asking for the document. I find in the Assange indictment when
they're talking about him encouraging by posting something on
the Internet––him asking does anybody have these ten
documents, I'd love to see them––has none of the hallmarks of

2021]

THE PRESS, WHISTLEBLOWERS

279

pressure or overbearing somebody’s will or threatening it or
something, it's really quite remote. But even in the direct
reporting situation, I think asking a fully sentiment adult, would
you give me a document, with that fully sentiment adult being
able to say no, shouldn't cross a First Amendment line.
Papandrea: Yeah, I'll just underscore that. Remember, I
think everyone on this panel has agreed that there might be a
different standard for government employees or contractors and
the third-party publishers. Assuming the government can
prosecute and does prosecute the original leaker, we can afford
to give more protection to the publishers. And even if it means
that they cajole and encourage and so on and so forth, unless
they're like beating someone up, tying them up, and forcing the
disclosure, which is not what we're talking about, I have no
confidence that the judiciary could draw a line that would be
workable. I do want to point out in the AIPAC prosecution, the
conspiracy aiding and abetting charges rested on the provision of
inviting the source to a baseball game and providing a fax
machine to which the source could send documents.69 I mean,
that is outrageous, but it's also exactly what the government
alleged was sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting the leak
of the information. So, I don't have any confidence that that line
can be drawn. But if they did draw it, I think it would cause just
a whole bunch of problems, and it's not necessary to hold the
publisher responsible when we can hold the leaker responsible
under certain circumstances.
Schulz: In response to the question, I certainly
acknowledge there are a lot of problems. I guess I was offering
that as one way of trying to sever Assange from bigger problems.
And I do think there is a difference to be made between a reporter
pursuing a story, knowing information, and trying to get support
or authentication. It seems to me different in kind than Assange
saying, just give me anything you’ve got. I want this whole file.
I want that whole file. I’m on a fishing expedition. That does
seem to me to be a different factual scenario that maybe alters
the presumptions that should apply in terms of his intent and the
government's legitimate ability to protect those secrets.
Fox: Thank you, I think those are all great answers. I had
another question about the intent that different types of leakers
69
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might have: should there be a different legal or ethical paradigm
applied to people who maybe hack and then leak information as
opposed to government employees who have authorized access
to information and leak it? And how is this affected by whether
the employees are acting as private citizens or whether
whistleblowing or communicating with the press is a part of their
job description?
Kitrosser: Well, I'll take at least the last part of that
because I've written a bit about how the First Amendment
protection differs depending on whether it's part of the
employee's job or not. So, as all the panelists know and many of
the people in the audience might know, the Supreme Court did
draw a pretty sharp line in the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos.70 This
isn't just for national security employees, but for government
employees generally, when the Supreme Court said that if you
speak in the course of actually doing your job, that receives no
First Amendment protection at all.71 Now, as to how they have
drawn that sharp line, I think that's deeply problematic for
reasons I won't expand on given the limited time we have left.
But suffice it to say, I think that sacrifices a great deal of speech
that is of utmost First Amendment value. I will say, in terms of
how that relates to national security leakers who leak classified
information, in the immediate wake of the Garcetti decision,
there was some speculation because of some of the language in
the case that might mean that there's no First Amendment
protection under Garcetti for people who come into the
possession of classified information as part of their job and leak
it because that's information that they wouldn't have had but for
their job. I will say the subsequent case of Lane v. Franks,72 I think,
actually eliminates that argument and makes pretty clear that just
because you came into possession of information due to your job
does not mean that when you convey that information you are
doing your job.73 So, I actually think there's a pretty good
argument a leaker could make that, almost by definition, if
they're leaking information that they're not supposed to be
leaking, they're not doing their job. So, in that sense, they're not
unprotected by the First Amendment from a Garcetti perspective.
Rather, the problem they run into is, again, this national security
exceptionalism argument that they keep hearing about. So, this
70
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question of whether you are doing it in the course of doing your
job or not, that, I think, is not really the hurdle that they have to
worry about.
Papandrea: On the hackers, you know, that is a really
good question because that has been a problem. It could be an
increasing problem, and I do worry about privacy of people
whose emails are hacked in that way. It's not distinguishable
from Bartnicki, just on the facts of it, except that one thing that a
lot of people don't focus on in the Bartnicki decision is that the
decision did say that they didn't need to hold the radio
broadcaster liable because they usually can identify who the
interceptor was. In the hacking, I think increasingly we're seeing
that the government has a lot of trouble identifying who the
hackers are, so that is perhaps a distinguishing factor. Dave
McCraw, maybe you have thoughts on hacking. I know that the
news outlets have their own journalistic ethics on reporting out
hacked information. So, in some ways, they're gatekeepers and
do not just republish everything that they get if it's hacked. But I
understand those are very difficult types of decisions. To me, this
whole hacking thing is distinguishable. I think we've been
focusing on this discussion more about government employees
who have access to this information as part of their jobs. But
people who are hacking is a whole different level, and I could
imagine it's going to be an increasing societal problem.
McCraw: And the First Amendment protection, I feel
very strongly that should be the same for the publisher. But I
think the ethical considerations are really troubling. When Sony
was first hacked by the North Koreans, The Times, as a matter of
standards, decided not to break stories from that hack. But if
others were writing about them, the secrecy was out, and it was
newsworthy, we'd write about it. It seemed that was different, a
private entity being hacked [as opposed to] the government
having its secrets purloined, as it were. But then you get to DNC,
and it's very hard to say that the DNC materials, even though
hacked, were not of such public interest that you wouldn’t write
about them. And I think virtually every journalistic organization
in the country did so. What I hear most often at The Times from
editors is that it's very important that we not only make good
decisions about what we're publishing––that there is a legitimate
news interest in it, a public interest in publishing it––but we also
need to tell the story of how it came to be in the public's hands,
that the story behind the story is it's the North Koreans because
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they're unhappy about a really terrible movie. It's the Russians
because they're interfering with the election, and we're going to
see more of that. I think the challenge for mainstream news
media organizations is to go out and tell that story behind the
story, even if they decide to publish some of the information that
is received.
Fox: Great, thank you. So, I think we'll just close on one
final question that I think ties together really all of our topics for
today. There are a lot of concerns these days about the state of
our democracy, about trust in our government institutions. How
does the rise in leak prosecutions that we've seen in recent years
relate to that? And how do all of the topics we've covered today–
–overclassification, leak prosecutions, national security
reporting––fit in with the theory of democratic self-governance
behind the First Amendment, the idea that the public needs this
information for citizens to be able to govern themselves in a
democracy. That’s a broad question, but I think we can tackle it
here in our last couple of minutes. Whoever wants to take a stab
at it first.
Kitrosser: I'll dive in. That is a very good question, but it
is a huge question. So, I'll sort of pick off little bits of it. Certainly,
the most intuitive way, of course, in which all of this relates to
self-governance is the notion that the people need to have some
idea of what's going on in order to be able to govern themselves
and hold their representatives accountable. This makes me think
of how the Roberts Court gets a lot of plaudits, generally, for
being very, very pro free speech. And yet, we have seen, I think,
the Court issue some very disappointing decisions when it comes
to speech that helps to inform us. So, it's the Roberts Court that
issued the Garcetti decision, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
which, although it's not directly about leaking classified
information, it kind of gives further steam to the national security
exceptionalism that underlies these lower court cases. So, it does
worry me that what we see from the Court is this very strong
embrace of, “you can say whatever you want, however offensive,
however upsetting,” which I do support as a matter of First
Amendment law, but there is much less importance placed on
the ability of people to actually be able to gain information so
that they can say informed things and inform each other and
govern themselves. I do worry, relating that to the bigger
question, that may reflect where we're at culturally in some ways
that we see a great deal of importance placed and concerns
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expressed about whether or not people are sufficiently able to
express themselves. We see concerns raised about cancel culture,
for example, and political correctness, which often are wielded
against people who say “well, I don't feel free to say things that
may offend people and may therefore lead me to be criticized,”
but there is much less concern expressed about whether people
are actually able to gain the information they need to govern
themselves. So, that's just a couple of tiny pieces I'm biting off of
that very large question. We can obviously speak for hours about
different ways to answer it, but those are just a couple of
thoughts.
Papandrea: Well, I think, Ashley, you answered the
question a little bit in the question by saying it's important for
people to be informed, and what I worry about is a crackdown
on the leakers. I really worry about the disintegrating trust in the
press and also just all the problems the press has in doing its job,
the financial models for the press to be successful. We're not
going to function well unless we have dedicated journalists. I
could be an ad for your newspaper, David McCraw. You know,
it's not enough to have people on social media sharing their ideas
about stuff. They have to get information from people who have
the knowledge and the expertise to analyze what is happening
and what the government is doing. And, particularly with all of
the information that the government is producing, the increase
of databases and so on, you have thousands and thousands,
millions and millions of documents, [it doesn’t help] unless you
have dedicated experts going through those materials, helping us
to understand what they mean. To me, this is a fundamental part
of making sure we have a working democracy. And we've had
such a weird system for decades where leakers occasionally
would be prosecuted, but not too often. The press, never. They
get called traitors, but they rarely actually are prosecuted. But I
see this threatened. I'm thrilled that Biden is president now for a
lot of reasons, but I think it's likely this administration will be
more appreciative of the role of the press. We won't hear
President Biden tweeting out fake news and attacking every
outlet, throwing garbage on journalists every day, encouraging
the supporters to beat up journalists at the rallies. All these
attacks, we could have a whole symposium on that. I'm hopeful
that, in the next four years, this administration will respect the
press. I don't mean to say it will always be rosy. There are always
disputes between the executive branch and the press. But
remember, this is four years, so we're fighting. We're in it for the
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long haul, and the people are turned against the press in a lot of
ways. So, I do worry, and I just applaud the work of Heidi, David
Schulz, David McCraw and the panelists this morning
continuing to research how we can solve this very difficult
problem.
Schulz: I would just say amen to all of that. Just to tie it
together with the panel this morning, I think it was Justice Black
in the Pentagon Papers case who said something like, national
security is a broad and vague term,74 and we need transparency
with respect to the national security issues we're talking about, in
particular, because, with respect to national security, the only
real check on government abuse is the people. And when we
keep it in secret, we have all sorts of problems. So, everything
that was said about the need for this, for democracy to function,
is especially true in oversight of our national security forces.
Fox: Great. Thank you so much. I think we'll end there.
I think we could all sit here and talk about these topics all day. I
know I could sit here and listen to these topics all day long.
Thank you, and thank you to everyone for coming today.
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